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Abstract: Objective: To evaluate the FDA’s approval process and postmarket surveillance strategies for THR devices. 
Design: The FDA Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) 510k releasable database was used to document 
approved THR devices. The CDRH Medical Device Reporting data files were used to study the efficiency of the FDA’s 
post-market surveillance system. Manufacturers were contacted to supply information regarding their implants. Medline 
was searched between 1966-1996 to determine the percentage of THR devices with published data on clinical outcomes. 
Results: Between 1976 and 1996, 701 new THR devices were approved by the Substantial Equivalent (SE) route and 34 
were approved on the basis of Premarket Approval PMA. The number of approvals doubled between 1991-1995 com-
pared to 1976-1990. Seventy-four different manufacturers obtained approval to market THR devices. Only four manufac-
turers obtained approval via the PMA application. Under Mandatory Device Reporting all revision arthroplasties should 
be reported. Using data from 2 independent services for which we had US hospital discharge data in 1993 we estimate that 
only 3% of all revision THR were reported to the FDA. Manufacturers of hip implants failed to provide useful informa-
tion. Medline search revealed only 15% of the approved THR devices had published data on outcomes. 
Conclusion: Current FDA premarket approval and postmarket surveillance strategies fail to provide information for evi-
dence-based selection of THR devices. Recommendations are made to avert problems with device failures. 
INTRODUCTION 
  Orthopedic surgery plays a critical role in the manage-
ment of many forms of arthritis. Total joint arthroplasty, in 
particular, dramatically improves function and quality of life 
in persons with end-stage hip and knee disease and its out-
comes are generally durable
  [1]
  Nevertheless, acute and 
chronic implant failures occur resulting in accelerated revi-
sion surgery. Examples of these include the rapid wear of 
previous new polyethylenes, such as carbon impregnated 
polyethylene, heat pressed polyethylene, and hylamer which 
did not improve outcomes and caused many accelerated revi-
sions [2]. Attempts at improved designs such as the ACS cup 
which was associated with excessive wear and ultimately led 
to recall and replacement [3]. A recent and widely publicized 
example was the Sulzer acetabular cup, Interop, which was 
recalled in 2000 after 17,000 implants because of acute 
failed arthroplasties from residue on the cup from the final 
cleaning process of the porous coating, a change in the 
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  The withdrawal of rofecoxib (Vioxx
®) in September, 
2004 and the ensuing discussion over the effectiveness and 
capacity of the Food Drug Administration (FDA) to protect 
the public safety [5-7] highlights again the challenges of 
post-marketing surveillance. Despite these mishaps post 
marketing surveillance of devices has had little or no study. 
  There are an estimated 200,000 primary hip replacements 
performed annually in the US
 [8] with a direct medical cost 
of total hip arthroplasty estimated at 2 billion dollars annu-
ally. All arthroplasties have a finite life and may need revi-
sion [9]. The majority of revisions are due to loosening of 
THR devices and most of these can be directly attributed to 
their design characteristics [9]. In 1993 there were over 
26,000 revisions performed in the US
 [10]. A tremendous 
research effort developing devices with improved survival 
and a competitive industry has resulted in an exponential 
increase in the number of THR devices being brought to 
market. Given the rapid expansion of this technology, we 
examined the FDA medical device approval process and 
postmarketing surveillance during a period (1976-1995) 
where there was available information on approved devices 
and sought the corresponding data on the clinical effective-
ness and patient-oriented outcomes of specific devices. 
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MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATORY PROCESS 
Pre-Market Approval 
  In the United States the Food and Drug Agency (FDA) 
regulates medical devices. Currently there are more than 
1700 different types of medical devices, 70,000 different 
products for specific applications, and 7,000 firms who have 
FDA approval to market these products
 [11]. The FDA has a 
sophisticated and stringent review process for pharmaceuti-
cal agents and its policies for medical devices have at-
tempted to replicate these standards to ensure their safety and 
effectiveness. 
  In 1976 FDA was given the authority to regulate medical 
devices under the Medical Device Amendment Act (MDA). 
This Act focused on the premarket review process and con-
tained four key elements including classification, three-tier 
controls, premarket notification system, and comparable 
regulation of old and new devices. Under classification the 
FDA categorized all existing and newly approved devices 
into seven (non mutually exclusive) categories including pre-
amendment device (devices that were on the market prior to 
1976), post-amendment device (devices brought to market 
after 1976), substantially equivalent device (post-amendment 
device that is equivalent to a pre-amendment or approved 
post-amendment device)
 [11] (Table 1). Prior to 1976 there 
were a handful of total hip implants available. These were 
classified as pre-amendment devices all pre-amendment hip 
devices were grandfathered under the MDA and allowed to 
remain on the market. 
Table 1.  Medical Device Classification System 
 
Categories   Description 
Pre-amendment  devices that were marketed prior to May 28, 
1976 (the date the MDA was signed into law) 
Post-amendment  devices that were approved by the FDA after 
the MDA was enacted 
Substantially Equiva-
lent 
devices that are substantially equivalent to pre-
amendment devices based on their design, ma-
terials, and intended use 
Implant 
devices that are inserted into a surgically 
formed or natural body cavity and intended to 
stay for at least 30 days. 
Custom 
devices generally not available to other li-
censed practitioners and not available in fin-
ished form 
Investigational 
devices undergoing clinical investigation under 
the authority of an Investigational Device Ex-
emption from the FDA 
Transitional 
devices which were regulated as drugs prior to 
the Medical Device Amendments but are since 
regulated as devices 
 
  The three-tier control system grouped devices into three 
categories depending upon the least amount of regulation 
necessary to provide reasonable assurance of safety and ef-
fectiveness (Table 2). Class I devices are required only to be 
registered with the FDA. Class II devices require manufac-
turers to provide data on their design, material properties, 
and mechanical characteristics. Class III devices require 
manufacturers to file a Premarket Approval application 
(PMA) which includes data from a controlled clinical trial. 
The distribution of pre-amendment devices into the three-tier 
system included 30% as Class I, 60% as Class II, and 10% as 
Class III [11]. 




devices for which General Controls including manufacturer reg-
istration and product listing with the FDA are adequate to ensure 
safety and effectiveness 
II 
devices for which General Controls are inadequate and special 
controls (i.e. standardized testing protocols, bench-testing or 
clinical data) are required to provide assurance 
III 
entirely new post-amendment devices, or devices with a new 
design, or new intended use, or devices found Not Substantially 
Equivalent (NSE) to pre-amendment devices for which there is 
insufficient information to assure their safety and effectiveness 
 
  The third element of the MDA was a premarket notifica-
tion system, which provided a mechanism for evaluating 
post-amendment devices. This requires manufacturers to 
notify the FDA prior to marketing any device not previously 
marketed. Notification consists of a 510(k) application, 
which describes the new device; it’s material and design 
characteristics, and intended use. The FDA reviews the 510k 
to determine if the device is “substantially equivalent” to an 
existing approved device and thereby giving it clearance for 
marketing. If the device is judged not substantially equiva-
lent, the manufacturer is required to submit a PMA applica-
tion prior to marketing. The PMA requires the manufacturer 
to submit data addressing questions of material biocompati-
bility, mechanical performance, biological function, and a 
controlled clinical trial comparing the performance of the 
proposed device with that of a control device
 [11, 12]. 
  The fourth element of the MDA was the principle that 
new devices should not be disadvantaged by the gradual im-
plementation of the MDA requirements. This allowed any 
post-amendment device that was substantially equivalent to 
either a pre-amendment or approved post-amendment device 
to be marketed until the FDA either established standards or 
demanded a formal PMA application for Class III devices. It 
was not until the late 1980’s that the FDA started to address 
the backlog of Class III pre-amendment devices and their 
substantially equivalent post-amendment counterparts for 
which PMA submissions were required to prove clinical 
safety and effectiveness
 [11]. Effectively this allowed pre-
amendment and post-amendment substantially equivalent 
total hip devices to be marketed without providing any clini-
cal performance data until the FDA issued a call for PMA 
submissions. In the case of total hip devices the FDA issued 
this call in September 1996. 
  In 1992 the FDA Commissioner at that time, Dr. David 
Kessler, formed the Committee for Clinical Review (CCR) 
to review the medical device approvals process of the agency
 
[11]. The CCR reviewed 24 PMA and 510(k) applications 
that were pending review or had been approved. They con-
cluded that the clinical data provided for approval (1) failed 
to utilize appropriate controls (2), used poorly defined his-
torical controls (3), used sample sizes inadequate to answer Improving the Postmarket Surveillance of Total Joint Arthroplasty Devices  The Open Rheumatology Journal, 2008, Volume 2        9 
questions (4), poorly characterized study subjects (5), poorly 
assessed the comparability of patients in treatment and con-
trol groups (6), failed to clearly and consistently define study 
endpoints, and (7) failed to have blind evaluation of subjec-
tive endpoints. 
POST-MARKET SURVEILLANCE 
  In 1993 Commissioner David Kessler summarized his 
agency’s position on the need for postmarket surveillance 
and that the safety and effectiveness of medical devices over 
a long period of time, in day-to-day use in unselected pa-
tients with comorbid conditions, without a protocol follow-
up of a formal clinical study could not be guaranteed with 
even the most stringent premarket approval process
  [13]. 
Initially the FDA’s primary strategy for post market surveil-
lance was the Problem Reporting Program (PRP), a com-
pletely voluntary system by which health professionals and 
consumers could notify the FDA of device related problems. 
Under-reporting of adverse events plagued the system and to 
improve postmarket surveillance Congress enacted the Safe 
Medical Devices Act (SMDA) in 1990. The SMDA estab-
lished the Mandatory Device Reporting program (MDR), 
which mandated reporting of death and serious injuries to the 
FDA by a nationwide sample of facilities specially trained to 
collect complete and accurate data on device-related prod-
ucts to the Medical Product Surveillance Network (MED-
SUN) [14]. “Serious injury” defined under MDR includes all 
events necessitating a return to the operating room related to 
a medical device failure. Under this definition nearly all re-
vision THR should be reported to the FDA although most 
would judge late revisions (1020 years out from the initial 
surgery) very differently than early revisions which are sen-
tinels of problems with the device. With the current reporting 
system, the surgeon doing the revision may not know the 
surgeon, the hospital, or the implant associated with the 
original surgery. 
METHODS 
Evaluation of Premarket Approval Process 
  To evaluate the pre-market approval process, a Freedom 
of Information request was submitted to the FDA to identify 
and describe the total number of hip replacement devices that 
had been approved from 1976 to 1995. It asked for all hip 
prosthetic devices listed under CFR21 subchapter H medical 
devices Part 888 orthopedic devices subpart D prosthetic 
devices number 888.3300 – 888.3410. For each device we 
requested the name, its manufacturer, the FDA classification 
(Class I, II or III), method of FDA pre-market approval 
(510k or PMA), and date of approval. Second, we inspected 
the FDA Internet web site at http:\\www.fda.gov for all 
medical devices approved by the FDA between 1976 to 1995 
by 510k or PMA applications. This database lists all devices 
by date of approval, device category, device name, its manu-
facturer, and method of approval (510k vs PMA). The data 
from these two sources were combined for this analysis. 
Evaluation of Postmarket Surveillance Process 
  To evaluate the effectiveness of the MDR postmarket 
surveillance system we obtained data from two independent 
sources from 1993 for which we had US hospital discharge 
data. First, we obtained from the FDA, the number of ad-
verse events reported to the MDR program for 1993. Second, 
we used the National Hospital Discharge Survey for 1993 to 
obtain the number of revision total hip replacements per-
formed in 1993
  [10]. The number of MDR reports were 
compared to the number of revision surgeries in 1993 to de-
fine the adverse event capture rate of the MDR system. 
Evaluation of Available Clinical Data 
  To assess the availability of data on the clinical outcomes 
of hip replacement devices we contacted the manufacturers 
identified in the pre-market approval evaluation exercise that 
had received approval between 1976 to 1995 for marketing a 
total hip device. Each manufacturer was asked to provide the 
names of all total hip devices they had marketed, a descrip-
tion of the device, details of the surgical technique, FDA 
classification, date of marketing, and any published data on 
the clinical outcomes of their device. 
  Second, to identify published information on the out-
comes of total hip devices we conducted a Medline search of 
publications from 1966 to 1996 using the key word “hip 
prosthesis” and text words for all possible combinations of 
total hip device trade names and/or names of manufacturers. 
Reports of in-vitro biomechanical testing of total hip devices 
were excluded. We were unable to search for devices ap-
proved by the PMA route, as the description of these im-
plants by the FDA did not include their trade names. For 
devices approved by the 510k processes we were able to 
systematically search for outcomes information by manufac-
turer and number of approved devices. 
RESULTS 
Pre-Market Notification and Approval Process 
  Between 1976-1995, 71,239 new medical devices were 
approved via the 510k notification process for devices that 
were developed post-MDA. Of these, 701 were prosthetic 
hip devices. Between 1976-1980 42 THR devices were ap-
proved, reflecting the relative infancy of the technology at 
that time (Fig. 1). During the 80’s there was a steady in-
crease in the number of approvals. Between the years 1981-
1985, 118 devices were approved compared to 137 between 
1986-1990. By far the largest number of approvals occurred 
between 1991-1995 when 404 devices were approved. This 
represents nearly 60% of all approvals in the last 20 years. 
All of these approvals were on the basis of a new device be-
ing substantially equivalent to an existing approved device. 
By satisfying this requirement, manufacturers were not re-
quired to provide clinical data on the safety and effectiveness 
of their device. 
  Seventy-four firms developed the 701 devices approved 
by the 510k process (Table 3). Of these 52 firms had fewer 
than 10 approvals each, representing 25% of the total num-
ber of approved devices. Thirteen firms held between 10-19 
approvals each, representing 24% of all approved devices. 
Nine firms held 20 or more approvals each representing over 
50% of all approved devices. 
  Between 1976-1995, only 34 hip devices were approved 
via a PMA application that requires submission of clinical 
data from a controlled clinical trial (Table 4). Four firms 
obtained these approvals, in contrast to 74 that held 510k 
approvals. Each of these 4 firms held more than 20 approvals 
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PMA approvals. The PMA approval process accounted for 
less than five percent of all THR device approvals. Clearly 
the 510k application process is the preferred process by 
manufacturers as it avoids the need for expensive clinical 
trials. 
Table  3.  Distribution of THR Devices Approved by 510k 
Process Between 1976-1995 
 
Number of Approvals Held 
 by  Manufacturer 
Number of   
Approved Devices 
Number of   
Manufacturers 
0 < 10  174 (25%)  52 (70%) 
10 to 19  169 (24%)  13 (18%) 
   20    358 (51%)  9 (12%) 
Total 701  74 
 
Table  4.  Distribution of THR Devices Approved by PMA 
Between 1976-1995 
 
Number of Approvals   
Held by Manufacturer 
Number of   
Approved Devices 
Number of   
Manufacturers 
0 < 10  4 (12%)  2 (50%) 
10 to 19  10 (29%)  1 (25%) 
   20    20 (59%)  1 (25%) 
Total 34 4 
 
POSTMARKET SURVEILLANCE 
  The FDA’s MDR system requires that manufacturers, 
user facilities, physicians, and manufacturers report any de-
vice-related deaths, serious injuries, and malfunctions. In the 
definition of serious injury revision total hip replacements 
are reportable   events. In   1993   a year in which we had    2   
 
independent sources of data (see methods) the MDR pro-
gram received 677 reports of prosthetic hip device related 
problems. The National Hospital Discharge Survey docu-
mented over 26,000 cases of revision THR for the same cal-
endar year 1993. Most experts in the field agree that implant 
failure due to aseptic loosening results from implant related 
problems and accounts for well over 50% of all revision 
THR (other indications for revision surgery include infec-
tion, technical errors, joint dislocations, etc.). Based on a 
conservative estimate that 50% of all revision THR are due 
to implant failure, in 1993 there were over 13,000 reportable 
cases (due to device related failure) and by our estimates, the 
MDR picked up only 6% of all reportable cases and under-
score the limitations of passive surveillance systems. 
INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON TOTAL HIP DE-
VICES 
  To evaluate the information available to physicians and 
patients regarding the safety of implants from all companies 
that had obtained FDA approval to market THR devices in 
the US we sought information regarding their devices, only 
six firms replied with partial descriptive information about 
their products. No published reports were provided. Our 
Medline search of approved THR devices are shown in Ta-
ble 5. Overall, only 15% of the 510k approved devices had 
any published data on clinical outcomes. Twenty-three per-
cent of approved devices from firms with fewer than 10 ap-
provals each had published reports on clinical outcomes. 
Surprisingly, the proportion of devices with published re-
ports from firms with 10-19 approvals and those with 20 or 
more approvals each were 17% and 11%, respectively. The 
vast majority of the published literature were case series 
from tertiary referral centres where the device was devel-
oped. There were no standardized methods of evaluating 
baseline patient characteristics nor standardized outcomes. In 
addition results were evaluated unblinded and used various 
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Table 5.  510k Approved THR Devices with Published Clini-
cal Data 
 
Number of Approvals 










Devices with   
Published  
Data (%) 
0 < 10  174  40    23% 
10 to 19  169  29    17% 
    20   358  38   11% 
Total 701  107    15% 
 
DISCUSSION 
  Between 1976-1995 the FDA approved over 95% of all 
hip replacement devices without requiring any clinical data 
on the safety or clinical effectiveness of the device. The 
MDR program, the FDA’s primary postmarket surveillance 
strategy for medical devices, captures only 6% of the report-
able THR device-related problems. This is similar to the re-
port by Castro et al. who estimated that less five percent of 
total joint related complications were reported to the FDA
 
[15]. This low rate of capture highlights the inability of this 
country’s strategy to ensure safety and effectiveness of these 
devices. The vast majority of THR devices between 1976-
1995 were approved and marketed with little oversight by 
the FDA. Attempts to obtain clinical data regarding THR 
devices from manufacturers were unsuccessful. Medline 
search revealed 15% of 510k approved THR devices had 
published data on clinical effectiveness. This is consistent 
with a British study by Murray et al that noted fewer than 
30% of available THR prostheses in the United Kingdom 
had any published clinical data
 [16]. Furthermore, similar to 
previous reports we found the majority of published data was 
of poor quality and not useful for critical comparison of in-
dividual devices [17, 18]. 
  The results of this study beg the question, is the current 
system of medical device regulation adequate to ensure the 
safety and effectiveness of medical devices? In the case of 
THR devices and we suspect all total joint arthroplasty de-
vices mandating a more stringent premarket approval process 
by the PMA route would not ensure the long term safety and 
effectiveness because the required duration of follow-up in 
FDA clinical trials for is two years. This is inadequate for 
devices which have service lives extending beyond 10 years. 
To streamline the premarket approval process, the FDA has 
reclassified the majority of THR devices from Class III to 
Class II
 [19]. As Class II devices, existing and new THR 
devices do not need to provide clinical data on safety and 
effectiveness prior to obtaining FDA approval. This policy 
makes postmarket surveillance even more important to en-
sure the long term safety and effectiveness of these devices. 
  The MDR postmarket surveillance system is ineffective, 
and the 1997 FDA Modernization and Accountability Act 
(FDAMA) have further restricted the ability of the FDA to 
conduct postmarket surveillance of medical devices. Under 
FDAMA the agency is no longer able to mandate postmarket 
surveillance of implantable medical devices
 [19]. The FDA 
must now seek voluntary support from manufacturers in or-
der to have them conduct postmarket surveillance studies, 
which are restricted to a maximum follow-up of 3.5 years. 
Consequently, the FDA in 1998 rescinded device tracking 
requirements for 14 device categories [19]. Overall, the 
FDA’s postmarket surveillance strategies are more limited 
now than in the early 1990’s under the SMDA. AdvaMed, 
the medical device industry lobbying group has opposed 
reform of the current FDA approval process for devices. 
  In comparison to the US situation, in Canada, medical 
device licensing is regulated by Health Canada’s Health 
Products and Food Branch (HPFB). There are more than 
22,000 pharmaceutical products and 40,000 medical devices 
available in Canada [21]. All medical devices manufactured 
in or imported into Canada require an application to Health 
Products and Food Branch. The items are classified based on 
their risk to the population into one of four classes. Class I 
devices do not require a license. Classes II to IV are granted 
licenses based on the application submitted which must in-
clude the purpose of the device as well the safety profile and 
proof of evidence of safety and effectiveness of the device. 
This is usually in the form of a randomized controlled trial. 
Health Canada requires medical device manufacturers to use 
a quality system certificate as evidence of compliance to the 
appropriate regulatory quality system requirement for manu-
facturing. Although Health Canada monitors products for 
failure and adverse effects, this is based on the reporting by 
manufacturers, health care professionals and consumers of 
the products and inspections of manufacturing plants and 
import shipments. In Canada and the United States, there is 
no specific requirement for the manufacturer to conduct post 
market surveillence [20]. 
  The increasing restrictions on the FDA premarket ap-
proval and postmarket surveillance point to the need for al-
ternative strategies to ensure the safety and clinical effec-
tiveness of these devices. One solution would be the estab-
lishment of a national THR registry. Such a registry exists in 
Sweden, which is 1/20 the size of the US and has a single 
payor health care system with almost complete electronic 
linkage of health care data [22]. Although a registry is an 
appealing option, it would be prohibitively expensive to es-
tablish and maintain. It would also require significant altera-
tions in the way medical information is collected and shared 
between various health care sectors and most importantly it 
would have to be mandatory not passive. These data would 
have to be linked to patient identifying information by a 
unique number, across different states, health care providers, 
physicians and health care institutions where patients receive 
care in violation of current HIPPA standards. Finally, it 
would have to include standardized data and be longitudinal 
for the life of the patient and/or the device to be useful. 
  We propose a novel solution which would be mandatory 
and a condition of approval, where an independent body 
would plan, oversee, and interpret the results from this sys-
tem. Key stakeholders would be non-voting members from 
orthopedic device manufacturers, orthopedic surgeons. Ex-
perts in outcomes measurement, statisticians, epidemiolo-
gists with no conflict of interest would be paid members. 
  The system would use standardized criteria for evaluation 
including minimum number of subjects to insure adequate 
numbers of subjects after natural attrition and drop outs to 
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adverse events. The system would be financed by all manu-
facturers in the form of evaluation fees. Devices that meet 
minimum standards for safety and effectiveness at specified 
follow-up intervals could be so acknowledged. This could be 
a powerful incentive for the industry which could use the 
information in their marketing of a device (for example, as 
having achieved milestones of longevity and/or outcomes. 
The body could be responsible for the dissemination of this 
information to patients, providers and payors (with appropri-
ate protection for manufacturers against product liability 
actions). 
  To make tracking specific, reimbursement for both pri-
mary and revision arthroplasty should be linked to detailed 
information about the implant determined à priori. All im-
plant components would be uniquely bar coded or similarly 
identified and tracked as a condition of payment for primary 
arthroplasty and when retrieved and/or replaced in revisions. 
The tracking system would also make surveillance systems 
using claims data as has been suggested [23] more informa-
tive linking outcomes to specific designs. 
  The success of this system would depend in part on the 
perceived need by manufacturers to voluntarily report clini-
cal performance data. This goal would be facilitated by sup-
port from patients, medical care providers, and payors who 
would benefit from an evidence-based approach to medical 
device selection. If large purchasers of health care were to 
require the use of only accredited implants in their organiza-
tions, the manufacturers would be more likely participate in 
the program. This form of postmarket surveillance could 
provide an efficient method for evaluating the performance 
of THR devices without increasing the regulatory require-
ments of the FDA. Furthermore it would not delay the intro-
duction of new technologies while at the same time improv-
ing the quality and level of information available on these 
devices. 
  This approach could be applied to any medical device. 
This scheme might add costs to the FDA but it might not 
since this system which replaces one that doesn’t work and 
which has untold costs for patients who suffer ill conse-
quences. In summary, we have studied the premarket notifi-
cation approval process and postmarket surveillance of the 
most common surgical device used in the management of 
patients with arthritis and musculoskeletal diseases and find 
that it is not working. Data on patient-oriented outcomes or 
on failed prostheses for specific designs is virtually non-
existent. We believe the same is true for other orthopedic 
implants. We propose a system to correct this. In the mean 
time, the public should be aware. 
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